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A Case for Evidence-Aware Distributed Reputation Systems – Overcoming the Limitations of Plausibilit
Activity-Based User Modeling in Service-Oriented Ad-hoc-Networks
Combining Query and Preference – An Approach to Fully Automatize Dynamic Service Binding
Comparison of Overlay Mechanisms for Service Trading in Ad hoc Networks
Coupled Signature and Specification Matching for Automatic Service Binding
Effective and Efficient Search for Services in Ad-hoc-Networks
Engineering Incentive Schemes for Ad Hoc Networks – A Case Study for the Lanes Overlay.
Handbuch zur DIANE Service Description
How Social Structure Improves Distributed Reputation Systems – Three Hypotheses
Integrating Preferences into Service Requests to Automate Service Usage
On User Support by Using Network Services
Position Paper for the First AKT Workshop on Semantic Web Services
RDF-Technologies to Provide Mobile Users with Services in Wireless Networks
The Buddy System – A Distributed Reputation System Based On Social Structure.
User Support for Formulating Complex Service Requests
Engineering Incentive Schemes for Ad Hoc Networks – A Case Study for the Lanes Overlay.
Title: | Engineering Incentive Schemes for Ad Hoc Networks – A Case Study for the Lanes Overlay. |
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Authors: | Philipp Obreiter, Birgitta König-Ries, Georgios Papadopoulos |
Source: | Proceedings of the EDBT Workshop on Pervasive Information Management, 18. March 2004 |
Place: | Heraklion, Greece |
Date: | 2004-03-01 |
Type: | Publication |
File: | 2004PIM.pdf |
Slides: | 2004PIM.ppt |
BibTex: |
@INPROCEEDINGS{OKP04, author = {Philipp Obreiter and Birgitta K{"o}nig-Ries and Georgios Papadopoulos}, year = 2004, title = {Engineering Incentive Schemes for Ad Hoc Networks - A Case Study for the Lanes Overlay}, booktitle = {First International Workshop on Pervasive Information Management {(EDBT}-Workshop)}, address = {Heraklion, Greece}, abstract = {In ad hoc networks, devices have to cooperate in order to compensate for the absence of infrastructure. Yet, autonomous devices tend to abstain from cooperation in order to save their own resources. Incentive schemes have been proposed as a means of fostering cooperation under these circumstances. In order to work effectively, incentive schemes need to be carefully tailored to the characteristics of the cooperation protocol they should support. This is a complex and demanding task. However, up to now, engineers are given virtually no help in designing an incentive scheme. Even worse, there exists no systematic investigation into which characteristics should be taken into account and what they imply. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a systematic approach for the engineering of incentive schemes. The suggested procedure comprises the analysis and adjustment of the cooperation protocol, the choice of appropriate incentives for cooperation, and guidelines for the evaluation of the incentive scheme. Finally, we show how the proposed procedure is successfully applied to a service discovery overlay.} } |